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THRIVING IN THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT:
CREATING STRUCTURES TO PROMOTE
TECHNOLOGY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
Daniel W. Sutherland1

The online environment is dramatically impacting our world. A global research organization has concluded that there are now more mobile devices in
the world than there are people, and that these devices are multiplying five
times faster than the human population.2 In Riley v. California, Chief Justice
John Roberts observed that “modern cell phones . . . . are now such a pervasive
and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.”3 One commentator
rightly observed that the “Internet . . . . has become the backbone to the 21rst
Century infrastructure[.]”4 IBM CEO Ginni Rometty has said that data “is the
phenomenon of our time. It is the world’s new natural resource. It is the new
basis of competitive advantage, and it is transforming every profession and
industry.”5 It is commonly estimated that ninety percent of all the data in the
world has been generated in the past three years.6 This new age is bringing
1
Daniel W. Sutherland is the Associate General Counsel for the National Protection
and Programs Legal Division within the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of the
General Counsel. From 2003 to 2009, he was the Department’s Officer for Civil Rights and
Civil Liberties. The views expressed in this article do not represent the Department of
Homeland Security and are entirely those of the author. This article is based on Mr. Sutherland’s remarks at the Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology Symposium, Cybersecurity and Privacy in the Internet Economy: Information Sharing, Data Security, and
Intellectual Property,” March 1, 2016.
2
Zachary Davies Boren, There Are Officially More Mobile Devices Than People in
The World, THE INDEPENDENT, (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/lifestyle/gadgets-and-tech/news/there-are-officially-more-mobile-devices-than-people-in-theworld-9780518.html.
3
Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
4
Dan Perrin, Cyber education is necessary for the future of mankind, WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 5, 2016, 12:04 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/cyber-education-isnecessary-for-the-future-of-mankind/article/2600936.
5
Ginni Rometty, Chairman, President & CEO, IBM, IBM Security Summit: New
Ways of Thinking about Enterprise Security (May 14, 2015).
6
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concrete changes to our economic activities, to how we learn, to our enjoyment
of sports and music, and to our understanding and practice of religion.
However, there are potential risks that must be addressed. The security of
the data that is now online is one such risk. How this explosion of data impacts our civil rights, civil liberties and privacy is another. Now foreign governments and private sector entities have access to treasure troves of data about
our movements through the day, the books we read and the people we associate with. As information is becoming the new coin of the realm, the appropriate uses of that information are becoming, and will remain, a core issue. In an
online environment, civil rights, civil liberties and privacy are not a niche issue
to be considered, but become a fundamental matter that must be addressed.
One method for addressing civil rights, civil liberties and privacy challenges
is to create structures that will help our institutions of government and commerce to better understand these issues and devise strategies to address them.
In fact, government and private sector entities are creating such structures –
organizations that work on the inside, that are welcomed as colleagues, that
identify issues at an early stage, and that give advice on how to design programs and capabilities in ways that enhance privacy, civil rights and civil liberties. These structures can help build the public’s confidence that the government and corporations can be trusted to handle data with discretion and effectiveness. This article will describe two organizations within the U.S. Department of Homeland Security that have had a valuable impact on the way that
security policies are being crafted. It will also identify other similar organizations in the public and private sectors. Finally, it will examine a case study – a
cybersecurity capability that has been dramatically influenced by the inclusion
of privacy and civil liberties professionals from the outset.
STRUCTURES FOR ENHANCING CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
A. Overview of the Homeland Security Act
In 2003, the President signed the Homeland Security Act. The new law
brought together twenty-two federal agencies and over 180,000 employees
with the mission of guarding the nation’s borders, enhancing the security of
America’s airports, and helping build resilience of the country’s infrastructure.7
The Homeland Security Act also included several innovative steps, including
SCIENCE DAILY (May 22,
2013), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/05/130522085217.htm
7
Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 2-230 (2012).
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the creation of two positions dedicated solely to the protection of civil rights
and civil liberties. The Congress thereby created a unique model of decisionmaking: for the first time in the federal government, an agency has two members of the senior leadership, reporting directly to the Cabinet Secretary, to
focus solely on how the agency’s decisions impact individual liberties.
B. The Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
The Homeland Security Act required that the President appoint an Officer
for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to “assist the Secretary in the performance
of the Secretary’s functions[.]”8 Section 705 of the Homeland Security Act
gives the Officer several tasks. The first is an investigative function – when a
citizen has a civil rights-related complaint, the Officer shall “review and assess
information concerning abuses of civil rights, civil liberties, and profiling on
the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion, by employees and officials of the Department . . . .”9 The second task is to develop and shape policy wherein the
Officer shall “assist the Secretary, directorates, and offices of the Department
to develop, implement, and periodically review Department policies and procedures to ensure that the protection of civil rights and civil liberties is appropriately incorporated into Department programs and activities. . . .”10 The third
major task is a compliance function – to review programs to ensure the Department’s actions are in accordance with “constitutional, statutory, regulatory,
policy, and other requirements related to the civil rights and civil liberties of
individuals affected by the programs and activities of the Department. . . .”11 In
all its work, the Officer is required to coordinate with the Department’s Privacy Officer.12
Thus, Congress created a unique civil rights office. 13 While other federal
agencies had offices that focus on civil rights, this was the only office that included “and Civil Liberties” in the title.14 The title shows that the Office addresses issues at the intersection of national security, civil rights, and civil lib-

Id. at § 103(d) (2012).
Id. at § 705(a)(1) (2012).
10 Id. at § 705(a)(3) (2012).
11 Id. at § 705(a)(4) (2012).
12 Id. at § 705(a)(5) (2012).
13 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.: OFF. FOR C.R. & C.L., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 705 OF THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT & THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
THE OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES 12 (2004),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CRCL-ReportJun04.pdf [hereinafter DHS REPORT TO
CONG.].
14 Daniel W. Sutherland, Officer for Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, DHS, Homeland
Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties: A One-Year Review (July 1, 2004).
8
9
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erties.15 Moreover, the Office has a distinctive internal function – assisting the
senior leadership to develop policies and initiatives in ways that protect civil
rights and civil liberties. The Office also has the simultaneous function of
providing compliance reviews and investigations of complaints. Finally, the
Office also has the responsibility for overseeing the Department’s equal employment opportunity program.16 This brings all civil rights-related issues under one office, including those with regard to the Department’s own employees
and those with regard to how the Department’s programs impact the general
public.17
Substantial investment has been made in this function. Secretary Thomas
Ridge18 decided that the Officer would be part of the senior leadership of the
Department, reporting directly to him, and the Congress later codified that decision.19 Moreover, the Department has committed substantial resources to the
Office.20 The Office’s budget is $21.8 million, which funds approximately 90
employees and several substantial programs.21 The Congress and the Department have been so pleased with the contributions of the Office for Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties that they have expanded its role (adding several new provisions into the authorizing language in Section 705 of the Homeland Security
Act) and its budget (moving from a staff of approximately 40 in 2004 to a staff
of almost 100 currently).22
The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties makes its contributions in
several areas. One of the key elements of Office’s mission is to provide proactive advice to the senior leadership of the Department.23 In its most recent
Annual Report to Congress, the Office states its first mission as, “[p]romoting
respect for civil rights and civil liberties in policy creation and implementation
by advising Department leadership and personnel, and state and local partners.”24 The Office has had broad impact across the Department, including
DHS REPORT TO CONG., supra note 13.
Id.
17 Id.
18 Thomas J. Ridge, Homeland Security Secretary 2003-2005, DHS,
https://www.dhs.gov/thomas-j-ridge (last updated May 16, 2016).
19 Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 704 (2012); see also DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.: OFF. FOR C.R. & C.L., FISCAL YEAR 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 6
(2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/crcl-fy-2015-annual-report.pdf
[hereinafter DHS 2015 FISCAL REPORT].
20 DHS 2015 FISCAL REPORT, supra note 19.
21 Id.
22 Cf. Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 705 of the Homeland Security
Act and the Establishment of the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (June 2004); see
also DHS 2015 FISCAL REPORT at iv.
23 DHS 2015 FISCAL REPORT at 11.
24 Id. at 5.
15
16
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shaping new screening protocols at airports, improving immigration processes,
building civil liberties protections into cybersecurity policies, enhancing intelligence analysis, and improving conditions in detention facilities.25
Two examples illustrate the Office’s impact on policy. In the first months of
the new Department, the Office was an integral part of the Department’s review of the Department of Justice, Office of Inspector General report on the
treatment of aliens detained in connection with the September 11th terrorism
investigations.26 As a result of that work, the Department sent guidance to all
immigration officers directing that detainees be given notice of the charges
against them within 72 hours of the time they are detained; established new
detention standards to improve communications between detainees and immigration officials, allowing for more oversight of conditions; and, established a
policy that immigration officers make an individualized and independent decision on bond and the closing of hearings every time an individual is detained. 27
A second example is in the technology area; the Office helped to create an
innovative program to provide accessible technology to people with disabilities.28 Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, requires the
federal government to ensure that electronic and information technology is
accessible to persons with disabilities.29 The law applies to all federal agencies
as they develop, procure, maintain or use such technologies.30 This includes
products and services such as computer hardware and software, telecommunications products, information kiosks, and web sites. Therefore, the Office for
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties co-chaired a project with the Chief Information
Officer to create the Office of Accessible Systems and Technology (OAST).31
The purpose of this office is to “ensure that all electronic information and
technology procured, developed, maintained, or used is accessible to DHS employees and customers with disabilities through a range of policy, training,
technical assistance and compliance activities.”32 This innovative function has
had enormous impact, including testing hundreds of IT and web-based apps,
remediating tens of thousands of pages of inaccessible documents posted on
the DHS websites, creating an Accessibility Compliance Center of Excellence,
administering a robust training program, and creating a Department-wide
helpdesk for accessibility questions.33 The office has also emerged as a recogId. at 7-8.
DHS REPORT TO CONG., supra note 13, at 18.
27 Id. at 19.
28 Id. at 21.
29 Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2012); DHS REPORT TO CONG., supra
note 13, at 21.
30 DHS REPORT TO CONG., supra note 13, at 21.
31 DHS 2015 FISCAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 57.
32 Id. at 7-8.
33 Id. at 58.
25
26
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nized leader across government; for example, it has in recent years helped lead
a cross-government effort to develop a “trusted tester” program.34
In addition to proactive policy advice and development, the Office has focused on areas such as training. It created the “Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Institute” to provide training on a large scale to the Department’s large workforce.35 In the first year of the Department’s existence, the Office became responsible for training law enforcement officers on the government’s policy
against racial profiling.36 It has provided training to Department employees on
a wide range of additional issues, such as screening involving religious travelers, and has worked with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center to enhance its training on Constitutional law.37
The Office also contributes by convening forums for members of the public
communicate with homeland security leaders.38 The Office has created regular
community roundtables in 16 cities across the country and periodic meetings in
other locations.39 There are two purposes for these roundtables: to enable citizens to communicate their concerns directly with homeland security officials,
and to explain the Department’s policies to citizens.40 These roundtables have
significantly benefited Department leadership as they receive direct feedback
on how programs and operations are being received, and then incorporate the
best ideas into new policy initiatives. This then produces greater trust between
communities and homeland security officials.41
Finally, the Office has made an impact on the Department through its role in
investigating and resolving complaints from the public that the Department has
in some way violated civil rights or civil liberties.42 This internal audit function is incredibly valuable to the Department’s leadership.43 First, it provides
early warning signs of potential abuses. Second, it allows them the opportunity
to resolve issues at an early stage, often before problems become the subject of
litigation, Congressional oversight or public outcry. Finally, it promotes public
Id.
Id. at 11.
36 See Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Institute, DHS.GOV, https://www.dhs.gov/civilrights-and-civil-liberties-institute, (last visited Oct. 7, 2016); see also DHS 2015 FISCAL
REPORT, supra note 19, at 16.
37 Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Institute, DHS.GOV, https://www.dhs.gov/civil-rightsand-civil-liberties-institute, (last visited Oct. 7, 2016).
38 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.: OFF. FOR C.R. & C.L., FISCAL YEAR 2014 ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS 11 (2016), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/crcl-fy-2014annual-report_0.pdf [hereinafter DHS 2014 FISCAL REPORT].
39 Id. at 13.
40 Id. at 11-12.
41 DHS 2015 FISCAL REPORT, supra note 19, at 13-14.
42 Id. at 27.
43 Sutherland, supra note 14.
34
35
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confidence because of the credibility of these investigations – the Office
demonstrates to stakeholders that these investigations do result in concrete improvements undertaken by the Department.
C. The Chief Privacy Officer
The Homeland Security Act required that the Secretary appoint a Chief Privacy Officer. Section 222 of the Act provides that the Chief Privacy Officer
reports directly to the Secretary of Homeland Security.44 Thus Congress established “the first statutorily required comprehensive privacy operation at any
federal agency.”45 Then-Secretary Ridge stated that the Privacy Office “will be
involved from the very beginning with every policy initiative and every program initiative that we consider, to ensure that our strategy and our actions are
consistent with not only the federal privacy safeguards already on the books
but also with the individual rights and civil liberties protected by the Constitution.”46
The Privacy Office’s scope and influence is not limited to the Department’s
headquarters; it is enhanced by parallel privacy offices in components such as
FEMA and the National Protection and Programs Directorate.47 The Chief Privacy Officer’s responsibilities fall into several categories. First, the CPO is
responsible for privacy policy within the Department, which, under Section
222(b), includes:
assuring that the use of technologies sustain, and do not erode, privacy protections
relating to the use, collection and disclosure of personal information; . . . .
evaluating legislative and regulatory proposals involving collection, use, and disclosure of personal information by the Federal Government;
conducting a privacy impact assessment of proposed rules of the Department or
that of the Department on the privacy of personal information, including the type
of personal information collected and the number of people affected;
coordinating with the Officer for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to ensure that –
programs, policies, and procedures involving civil rights, civil liberties and privacy considerations are addressed in an integrated and comprehensive manner; and,
Congress receives appropriate reports on such programs, policies, and procedures;
and
preparing a report to Congress on an annual basis on activities of the Department
that affect privacy, including complaints of privacy violations, implementation of
Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 142(a) (2012).
U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.: PRIVACY OFF., ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 1 (20032004), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy_annualrpt_2004.pdf
[hereinafter PRIVACY OFF. 2003-04 REPORT TO CONG.].
46 Id.
47 Nuala O’Conner Kelly, Chief Privacy Officer, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Keynote
Address at the 25th International Conference of Data Protection Privacy Commissioners
(Sept. 11, 2003).
44
45
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the Privacy Act of 1974, internal controls, and other matters. 48

One example of how the Department has leveraged the expertise of privacy
professionals has been in developing policies and protocols with the European
Union.49 From the beginning of the Department’s existence the Privacy Office
has worked closely with the Europeans on issues related to “passenger name
record” data – information about people who are planning to fly to the United
States.50 The office played a key role in advising the Department on the issues
involved in obtaining this information.51 After the United States entered into
an agreement with the European Union in 2004, the Privacy Office then took
on an important role in implementing the terms of the “Passenger Name Record” (PNR) agreement. For example, it posted “privacy statements that might
be used by airlines, travel industry representatives, and central reservation systems.”52 The office was also responsible for annual joint reviews of the implementation of the PNR Agreement, a key aspect of ensuring credibility with
the European authorities. 53 These responsibilities associated with the PNR
agreement continue, with the office in 2015 undertaking a Privacy Compliance
Review of the Department’s implementation of the 2011 version of the PNR
agreement.54
Other examples of leveraging the expertise of the Privacy Office includes
involvement with evaluating policy on unmanned aerial vehicles,55 reviewing
the operations of all fusion centers around the country,56 and helping to shape
the Department’s approach to “big data.”57 The Privacy Office invests a great
deal in reviewing Department programs and operations to determine how those
6 U.S.C. § 142.
PRIVACY OFF. 2003-04 REPORT TO CONG., supra note 45, at 11.
50 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.: PRIVACY OFF., A REP. CONCERNING PASSENGER
NAME REC. INFO. DERIVED FROM FLIGHTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE E.U. 2 (2008),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pnr_report_20081218.pdf [hereinafter
PASSENGER NAMES].
51 PRIVACY OFF. 2003-04 REPORT TO CONG., supra note 45, at 14.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. PRIVACY OFF., ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 3 (20142015),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/dhsprivacyoffice2015annualreportfinal-11102015.pdf [hereinafter PRIVACY OFF. 2014-15 REPORT TO CONG.].
55 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. PRIVACY OFF., FINAL ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 2
(2014),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/dhs-privacy-office-2014-annual-reportFINAL.pdf [hereinafter FINAL 2014 ANN. REPORT TO CONG.].
56 U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. PRIVACY OFF., ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS ii (20092010),
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_rpt_annual_2010.pdf [hereinafter PRIVACY OFF. 2009-10 REPORT TO CONG.].
57 FINAL 2014 ANN. REPORT TO CONG., supra note 55, at 2.
48
49
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initiatives measure up against federal privacy protection statutes58 and Departmental policy.59 The Office’s compliance work “ensures that privacy protections are built into Department systems, initiatives, projects, and programs as
they are developed and modified.”60 The Office uses tools such as Privacy
Threshold Analyses, Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs), and Privacy Compliance Reviews.61 These tools help to integrate compliance process into the Department’s daily work and its rhythm of developing, deploying, and reviewing
programs. By engaging with program managers at the earliest stages of program design, the Privacy Office is able to ensure that Fair Information Practice
Principles are understood and considered in the development stage.62 In fiscal
year 2015 alone, the Office participated in the development of 47 new or updated PIAs and published 27 Systems of Records Notices.63
This compliance work has dramatically impacted the Department’s cybersecurity mission. The DHS website posts PIAs related to major cybersecurity
programs (and also has several other PIAs on other cyber programs that are
now retired).64 For example, privacy professionals have carefully examined all
three generations of the EINSTEIN intrusion detection and prevention capability and issued extensive PIAs on the programs.65 The PIAs document how the
programs have been improved through the application of privacy principles,
and enhance public trust and confidence because of the transparency of these
reviews.66
58 See Authorities and Responsibilities of the Chief Privacy Officer, available at
https://www.dhs.gov/chief-privacy-officers-authorities-and-responsibilities, citing the Privacy Act of 1974, the E-Government Act of 2002, the Freedom of Information Act of 1966,
and the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.
59 Privacy Office, DHS.GOV, https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-office (last updated July 28,
2016).
60 PRIVACY OFF. 2014-15 REPORT TO CONG., supra note 54, at 30.
61 Privacy Compliance, DHS.GOV, https://www.dhs.gov/compliance (last updated June
10, 2016); Privacy Impact Assessments, DHS.GOV, https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-impactassessments (last updated Aug. 24, 2015); Privacy Reviews and Investigations, DHS.GOV.
https://www.dhs.gov/investigations-reviews (last updated June 17, 2016).
62 PRIVACY OFF. 2014-15 REPORT TO CONG., supra note 54, at 30.
63 Id. at 2.
64 Cybersecurity and Privacy, DHS.GOV, https://www.dhs.gov/cybersecurity-andprivacy (last visited Oct. 6, 2016). Privacy Impact Assessments have been posted on all
three generations of the EINSTEIN intrusion detection program, the Enhanced Cybersecurity Services program, and the National Cybersecurity Protection System. See
https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-documents-national-protection-and-programs-directoratenppd.
65 See Einstein, DHS.GOV, https://www.dhs.gov/einstein (last visited Oct. 6, 2016)
(“The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the mission to provide a common baseline of security across the federal executive branch . . . this common baseline is provided in
part through the EINSTEIN system.”).
66 Privacy Documents for the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD),
DHS.GOV, https://www.dhs.gov/privacy-documents-national-protection-and-programs-

10

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 25.1

The Office has broad impact across the Department through its extensive
training programs. The Office leads both in-person and web-based training
programs, reaching thousands of employees every year through efforts such as
new employee training, the “Compliance Boot Camp,” and training for fusion
centers.67 Just as with the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, the Privacy Office provides forums for the Department’s leadership to engage with
interested stakeholders. It has established a formal advisory board, the Data
Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee, which meets regularly to study
DHS programs and operations, provide feedback to the Department, and issue
recommendations for improvements. 68 Finally, the Privacy Office is also responsible for programmatic functions such as leading the Freedom of Information Act program for the Department and administering the obligations in
the Privacy Act.69
The Chief Privacy Officer’s responsibilities are broad and designed to ensure that the influence of privacy professionals will be felt in all corners of the
Department’s programs and operations. Over the Department’s twelve years,
privacy professionals have substantially impacted and improved the Department’s programs and operations.
D. Exporting the Model
The Department of Homeland Security stands out because it has two civil
libertarians in senior leadership – their sole motivation being protecting privacy, civil rights and civil liberties.70 These officers provide preventative advice
and serve as internal auditors, investigating concerns and ensuring compliance
in such a credible way that it builds public trust and confidence. These officers
have been given substantial resources, and have reach across the entire Department.71
The success of the Homeland Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties has led Congress and the Executive Branch to mandate similar offices
across the Executive Branch.72 In 2007, Congress passed the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act, which required enhanced
directorate-nppd (last visited Oct. 6, 2016).
67 PRIVACY OFF. 2014-15 REPORT TO CONG., supra note 54, at 25.
68 Id. at 20.
69 Id. at 9, 20.
70 Daniel W. Sutherland, Security and Freedom: Honoring our Values, DHS.GOV (Dec.
17, 2007), https://www.dhs.gov/journal/leadership/2007/12/security-and-freedom-honoringour.html.
71 Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, DHS.GOV (Oct. 5, 2015),
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/civil-rights-and-civil-liberties.
72 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee-1 (2014).
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screening of cargo entering the country, redistributed counter-terrorism funding, and authorized fusion centers.73 One of most significant provisions of the
law was to require Cabinet agencies to “designate not less than 1 senior officer
to serve as the principal advisor to” assist the agency in developing policies
and programs in ways that comport with civil rights and civil liberties.74 Congress thus required that the Departments of Justice, Defense, Treasury, Health
and Human Services, and Homeland Security, along with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
(ODNI), have a privacy and civil liberties office. The responsibilities for these
offices are modeled on the authorities given to DHS’s Office for Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties and Chief Privacy Office:
“assist the head of such department … in appropriately considering privacy and
civil liberties concerns when such officials are proposing, developing, or implementing laws, regulations, policies, procedures, or guidelines;”
conduct reviews of “department … actions, policies, procedures, guidelines, and
related laws and their implementation to ensure that such department … is adequately considering privacy and civil liberties in its actions;” and,
ensure that the department has “adequate procedures to receive, investigate, respond to, and redress complaints from individuals[.]”75

Congress provided principals to guide their work:
“that the need for power is balanced with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties;”
“that there is adequate supervision of the use by such department, agency, or element of the power to ensure protection of privacy and civil liberties; and,
“that there are adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine its use.”76

Therefore, other Cabinet departments now have the ability to benefit from
structures similar to those that have been in place at DHS since 2003. The
Cabinet departments and the Congress are making decisions on how to fund
each office and how to place the offices in the agencies’ organizational structure. While the departments are deciding daily how to integrate these offices
into the daily operations of the agency, the structures are in place.
These civil liberties entities could benefit a wider range of government
agencies and many private companies. For example, consider if a major urban
police department appoints a senior advisor to the chief of police who is focused on civil rights and civil liberties. If this senior advisor was given a substantial staff and resources, the police department would quickly benefit from
improvements in training, in better policies and protocols governing SWAT
teams, in policies for responding to crowd disturbances, and in engaging with
73 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No.
110-53, 121 Stat. 266 (2007).
74 Id.
75 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ee-1 (2014).
76 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ee-1(a)(1)-(3) (2014).

12

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 25.1

the community. Similarly, a company that collects information about consumers could build confidence and trust among its customers and regulators if it
has a privacy office with resources and influence inside the organization.
CASE STUDY: AUTOMATED INDICATOR SHARING
Privacy and civil liberties professionals within the Department of Homeland
Security have been able to strongly influence the development of policy and
the tactical daily operations of programs. The Department’s cybersecurity program offers a recent example of the impact privacy and civil liberties professionals can have.
A. The Foundation for Information Sharing
Cybersecurity has emerged as one of the country’s top national security
threats. 77 The Administration and Congress have therefore decided that the
country must have “an ecosystem where as soon as a company or federal agency observes an attempted compromise, the indicator will be shared in real time
with all of our partners, protecting them from that particular threat. 78 That
means adversaries can only use an attack once, which increases their costs and
ultimately reduces the prevalence of cyber attacks.”79
Any analysis of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 must begin one year earlier,
with the passage of the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014
(NCPA).80 This law codified the role of DHS’s National Cybersecurity and
Communication Integration Center (NCCIC), and laid the foundation for the
future legislation.81 The NCPA establishes the NCCIC as a central player in
the federal government’s information sharing about cybersecurity risks with
the private sector, as well as an entity that provides cybersecurity technical
assistance and incident-response capabilities to the private sector upon request.82 Moreover, the NCPA authorizes the NCCIC to develop and regularly
exercise cyber incident response plans. The NCPA makes clear that the
77 Sandra I. Erwin, Stew Magnuson, & Jasmin Tadjdeh, Top Five Threats to National
Security in the Coming Decade, NAT’L DEF. INDUS. ASS’N (Nov. 2012),
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2012/november/pages/topfivethreatstonati
onalsecurityinthecomingdecade.aspx.
78 Automated Indicator Sharing, DHS.GOV, https://www.dhs.gov/ais# (last visited Oct.
17, 2016).
79 Id.
80 National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-282, 128 Stat. 3066
(2014).
81 Id.
82 Id.
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NCCIC’s information sharing and technical assistance authorities are not explicitly limited to critical infrastructure but rather apply more broadly to federal and non-federal entities. 83 Almost exactly one year later, the President
signed the Cybersecurity Act of 2015.84
B. The Cybersecurity Act of 2015
Background
As a result of the 2014 NCPA, and under the authority of Presidential Policy
Directive 21, the Department of Homeland Security began developing a capability that would allow machine-to-machine sharing of cyber threat indicators.85
For the past several years, the Department joined many organizations in sharing information about cybersecurity threats, but the sharing was primarily conducted through humans – that is, a company or security researcher would identify a vulnerability and either send an email to the NCCIC or call the service
desk.86 Analysts would then review the information, compare it to other data
available to the NCCIC, and, if appropriate, email it to various organizations
for their action. This form of information sharing has been important; for the
first time, organizations have begun sharing critical data between each other,
with the government, across sectors and across governments.87
While significant, this form of sharing involves humans and therefore does
not move at the speed necessary. Therefore, the Department began to pilot an
automated capability, where machines could communicate important cybersecurity threats and measures to defend against those threats directly with other
machines. The Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) initiative was designed to
be a capability that receives, processes, and disseminates cyber threat indicators in real-time.88
In December of 2015, Congress turned this initiative into a mandate. Under
the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, the Department of Homeland Security is required to “develop and implement a capability and process” that “shall accept
from any non-Federal entity in real time cyber threat indicators and defensive
Id.
The Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242 (2015).
85 Press Release, The White House, Presidential Policy Directive—Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience: PPD-21, (Feb. 12, 2013) (on file with author).
86 National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, DHS.GOV,
https://www.dhs.gov/national-cybersecurity-and-communications-integration-center (last
visited Oct. 14, 2016).
87 Id.
88 Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS), DHS.GOV, https://www.dhs.gov/ais (last visited
June 21, 2016).
83
84
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measures.”89 The DHS capability shall “be the process by which the Federal
Government receives cyber threat indicators and defensive measures . . . that
are shared by a non-Federal entity with the Federal Government . . . .”90 DHS
was directed to receive those submissions by electronic mail, an interactive
form on an Internet website, or through a “real time, automated process between information systems . . . .”91
Under the law, the Secretary of Homeland Security was required to certify
to the Congress that the automated process was functional:
[T]he Secretary of Homeland Security shall . . . submit to Congress a certification
as to whether the capability and process required by paragraph (1) fully and effectively operates . . . [as] the process by which the Federal Government receives
from any non-Federal entity a cyber threat indicator or defensive measure under
this title . . . .92

Congress established an extremely aggressive timeline: this certification had
to be made within 90 days of the date of enactment.93 Because the Department
had been working on AIS, the Secretary was able to meet the Congressional
mandate and certify that a “real time, automated process” is operational. 94
Thus, the Department has initiated what will hopefully become a multidirectional information sharing environment, allowing governments, companies and academia to block malicious intrusions before they occur.
Types of Information to be Shared
The Cybersecurity Act defines the specific types of information that can be
shared under the real time process. The Act establishes two types of information that can be shared: “cyber threat indicators” and “defensive
measures.”95 Each of these is very carefully defined. The term “cyber threat
indicator,” or CTI, is defined in eight sub-parts, as information that is necessary to describe or identify:
Malicious reconnaissance, including anomalous patters of communication that appear to be transmitted for the purpose of gathering technical information related to
a cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability;
A method of defeating a security control or exploitation of a security vulnerability;
A security vulnerability, including anomalous activity that appears to indicate the
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, 6 U.S.C.A. § 1504(c)(1) (West 2016).
Id. at § 1504(c)(1)(B).
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id. at § 1504(c)(2)(A).
94 Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS), US-CERT., https://www.us-cert.gov/ais (last
visited Oct. 4, 2016).
95 6 U.S.C.A. § 1501(6) & (7).
89
90
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existence of a security vulnerability;
A method of causing a user with legitimate access to an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system to
unwittingly enable the defeat of a security control or exploitation of a security
vulnerability;
Malicious cyber command and control;
The actual or potential harm caused by an incident, including a description of the
information exfiltrated as a result of a particular cybersecurity threat;
Any other attribute of a cybersecurity threat, if disclosure of such attribute is not
otherwise prohibited by law; or
Any combination thereof.96

Guidance produced by the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security
provides specific examples that help explain the term “cyber threat indicator.”97
A CTI could include a software publisher that reports on a vulnerability that it
has discovered in its software; a security researcher that reports on the domain
names or IP addresses associated with botnets; a company experiencing a distributed denial of service attack to its public-facing website could report the IP
addresses that seem to be sending the malicious traffic; or, a managed security
service company could submit a pattern of domain name lookups that it believes correspond to malware infections.98
CSA also required that “defensive measures” should be included in the realtime sharing environment. This complex term is defined in the statute: “[A]n
action, device, procedure, signature, technique, or other measure applied to an
information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting
an information system that detects, prevents, or mitigates a known or suspected
cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability.” 99
The DOJ/DHS guidance also tries to more specifically define the concept of
defensive measures by citing several examples, including: an individual could
share with others a computer program that identifies a pattern of malicious activity in web traffic; a method for loading signatures into a company’s intrusion detection system; or a firewall rule that prevents certain types of traffic
from entering a network.100

Id. at § 1501(6).
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE TO ASSIST NON-FED. ENTITIES TO SHARE CYBER THREAT INDICATORS & DEFENSIVE MEASURES WITH FED. ENTITIES
UNDER THE CYBERSECURITY INFORMATION SHARING ACT OF 2015 4 (2016), https://www.uscert.gov/sites/default/files/ais_files/NonFederal_Entity_Sharing_Guidance_%28Sec%20105%28a%29%29.pdf [hereinafter DHS &
DOJ GUIDANCE].
98 Id.
99 6 U.S.C.A. § 1501(7).
100 DHS & DOJ GUIDANCE, supra note 97, at 7.
96
97
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Incentives to Share
Congress recognized that the private sector had to overcome a number of
potential obstacles if companies are to participate in this information sharing
environment. Therefore, CSA explicitly states that if a company shares CTIs or
defensive measures, it “shall not constitute a waiver of any applicable privilege
or protection provided by law, including trade secret protection.”101 Moreover,
proprietary information can be protected: “a [CTI] or defensive measure
…shall be considered the commercial, financial, and proprietary information of
such non-Federal entity[.]”102 Such communications will also be exempt from
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act and state and local disclosure
laws.103 This type of information sharing will not be considered an ex parte
communication with a federal administrative decision-making official.104 The
statute also makes clear that these communications will not be considered an
anti-trust violation for companies to join together to share cyber threat information.105 Finally, the incentive that received the most notice and commentary
was the Act’s liability protections. CSA provides that “[n]o cause of action
shall lie or be maintained in any court against any private entity, and such action shall be promptly dismissed, for the sharing or receipt of a cyber threat
indicator or defensive measure[.]”106
Sharing within the Federal Government
Congress wanted to ensure that DHS would pass the cyber threat information it receives on to other federal agencies with responsibilities in this arena. Therefore, the CSA requires that DHS “ensures that all of the appropriate
Federal entities receive in an automated manner such cyber threat indicators
and defensive measures shared through the real-time process[.]”107 The Act also
made clear that the automated process is not to be the exclusive method for the
private sector to share cyber information with the Federal government – organizations are free to continue to share information with law enforcement, if they
have statutory obligations to report such information, or if they have contractual requirements to share such information.108

101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108

6 U.S.C.A. § 1504(d)(1).
Id. at § 1504(d)(2).
Id. at § 1504(d)(3)(B).
Id. at § 1504(d)(4).
Id. at § 1503(e)(1).
Id. at § 1505(b).
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, 6 U.S.C.A. § 1504(c)(1)(C) (West 2016).
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, 6 U.S.C.A .§ 1504(c)(1)(E) (West 2016).
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Perceived Challenges
There were, of course, a number of challenges raised as an information sharing environment on cyber threats was discussed. One of the key concerns was
aggressively advocated by a number of civil liberties and consumer groups:
that the government should not be empowered to accumulate vast treasure
troves of data. The advocates were concerned that CTIs and defensive
measures would include sensitive Personally Identifiable Information, and that
the government would not adequately protect this information. As a corollary,
there was concern that proprietary information of companies also would be
accumulated by government and sloppily handled.
One letter written by advocates several months before the legislation passed
the Congress highlights the concerns:
Revelations about the National Security Agency’s secret collection of the personal
information of millions of Americans highlighted the critical need for more oversight of government intelligence agencies and protections of consumers’ sensitive
personal information. Common sense would tell us that expanding opportunities
for government surveillance is not the solution . . . Rapid and expansive sharing of
cyber threat data between corporations and government agencies without sufficient safeguards will increase the risk of misuse of that information.109

Many agencies are at the forefront working together, implementing, and
hosting this new real time, automated capability. Because of the investment
that DHS made to build its privacy, civil rights and civil liberties structures, the
Administration and the Congress ultimately decided that DHS should be the
host. 110 Cong. Michael McCaul, Chairman of the House Homeland Security
Committee, said, “DHS has some of the strongest privacy protection mechanisms in the federal government . . . . [and] [s]uch built-in privacy oversight is
an important reason why DHS is the leading civilian interface for these exchanges.”111 Therefore, DHS’s privacy and civil liberties structures were put to
the test by the requirements of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015.
C. Privacy and Civil Liberties Protections
Congress and the Department of Homeland Security took action to address
the privacy and civil liberties concerns that had been one of the most substantial barriers to passage of CSA. Congress inserted policy and operational pa-

109 Letter from Center for Democracy & Technology et al., Consumer Advocates, to
Hon. Mitch McConnell, Senator, U.S. Senate (Oct. 21, 2015),
https://cdt.org/files/2015/10/CISA_Letter_10.21.15.pdf.
110 Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, 6 U.S.C.A §1504(c)(1)(C) (West 2016).
111 Michael McCaul, Chairman, U.S. Committee on Homeland Security, Safeguarding
the Digital Frontier: The Way Ahead for American Cybersecurity and Civilian Network
(Mar. 17, 2015) (transcript on file with author).
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rameters, while the Department focused on the design of AIS.
Policy and Operational Parameters
Congress established limitations on how information can be shared. The law
requires federal entities to review and remove any information that is shared to
ensure that unnecessary personally identifiable information is not provided to
the government. This can be accomplished through human review (Section
1502(d)(2)(A)) or through a “technical capability configured to remove any
personal information . . . not directly related to a cybersecurity threat[.]”112
Congress also inserted limitations on how cyber threat information can be
used. It required that information can be disclosed to, retained by, and used by
any Federal agency only for “a cybersecurity purpose.”113 The only exception is
if a government agency believes that information shared will be relevant to “an
imminent threat of death, serious bodily harm, or serious economic harm, including a terrorist act or a use of a weapon of mass destruction.”114 If a company shares cyber threat information that implicated a “serious threat to a minor,
including sexual exploitation and threats to physical safety,” then the government can use it to prevent, investigate, disrupt or prosecute any such crime.115
Congress also ensured that there would be extensive audits and reviews.116
The Inspectors General of the agencies implementing AIS must submit a report
every 2 years to the Congress that includes an “assessment of the sufficiency of
the policies, procedures, and guidelines . . . . relating to the removal of information not directly related to a cybersecurity threat that is personal information
of a specific individual or information that identifies a specific individual.”117
Moreover, within 3 years after the passage of the CSA the Comptroller General
is required to submit to Congress a report “on the actions taken by the Federal
Government to remove personal information from cyber threat indicators or
defensive measures[.]”118
Congress also required the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice to
join together to write guidelines to set parameters for the design of the capability. CSA requires that the Executive Branch issue 4 sets of guidance surrounding this program: guidance to the private sector for how it can participate in the

112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id. at § 1504(b)(1)(E)(ii).
Id. at § 1504(d)(5)(A)(i).
Id. at § 1504(d)(5)(A)(iv).
Id. at § 1504(d)(5)(A)(v).
Id. at § 1506(b)(2)(B)(i)-(iv).
Id. at § 1506(b)(1).
Id. at § 1506(c).
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information sharing offered by AIS; 119 guidance to federal agencies for how
they can participate;120 guidance for federal agencies for how to handle CTIs
that the agencies receive;121 and, guidance “relating to privacy and civil liberties which shall govern the receipt, retention, use and dissemination of cyber
threat indicators[.]”122
Through these guidelines, Congress required that the new machine-tomachine capability had to be designed with a number of core privacy and civil
liberties in mind, including:
Ensuring that the seven foundational “Fair Information Privacy Principles” had to
be incorporated into the design;
Limiting the length of time that a CTI containing personally identifiable information may be retained;123
Notifying entities participating in AIS if they submit information that does not
qualify as a CTI under the act;124 and,
If any personally identifiable information has to be included with a CTI, ensure it
is protected throughout the information sharing environment “to the greatest extent practicable.”125

The DHS/DOJ Guidance builds on these principles by instructing companies
to limit the information they attempt to share with the government. 126 The
Guidance does not leave this as a general concept, but goes into detail on specific types of information that could contain personally identifiable information
and therefore should not be shared, including:
Protected Health Information, including anything in the company’s files that relates to an individual’s past, present, or future physical or mental health, and to
that individual’s possible payment for medical services;
Human Resource Information, defined to include sensitive data in an employee’s
personnel file;
Consumer Information/History, including information regarding goods an individual purchases and personal credit;
Education History, referencing the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
(FERPA);
Financial Information, including “anything from bank statements, to loan information, to credit reports;”

DHS & DOJ GUIDANCE, supra note 97, at 4.
6 U.S.C.A. § 1502(a); DHS & DOJ GUIDANCE, supra note 97, at 4.
121 6 U.S.C.A. § 1504 (interim guidance must be published within 60 days of enactment
and final guidance must be published within 180 days of enactment); DHS & DOJ GUIDANCE, supra note 97, at 3.
122 6 U.S.C.A § 1504(b)(2)(A) (interim guidance must be published within 60 days of
enactment and final guidance must be published within 180 days of enactment); DHS &
DOJ GUIDANCE, supra note 97, at 3.
123 6 U.S.C.A. § 1504(b)(3)(B).
124 Id. at § 1504(b)(3)(E).
125 Id. at § 1504(b)(3)(F).
126 DHS & DOJ GUIDANCE, supra note 97, at 3-4.
119
120
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Information about property ownership; and, finally,
Information on children under the age of 13 (citing the Children’s Online Privacy
Protection Act (COPPA)).127

Building Privacy Principles into AIS
All of these procedural limitations included in the statute were sensible.
However, these directions would not have been sufficient by themselves; fundamental steps need to be taken to address the privacy and civil liberties concerns. Because the Department had invested heavily in privacy expertise and in
ensuring that these privacy experts were embedded in the cybersecurity program offices at the Department, it was possible and natural to insert privacy
professionals into the design of the capability. The capability had to be built
by privacy professionals with privacy principles in mind.
The work actually began after the passage of the NCPA in 2014, as DHS
began to develop the contours of a real-time automated machine-to-machine
sharing capability.128 At that time, the NPPD Privacy Office129 conducted an
extensive Privacy Impact Assessment of AIS; the PIA was first version was
published just weeks before the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 was enacted, and an
updated version was published 90 days after the law was passed.130
With the parameters laid out in the statute, the DHS/DOJ Guidance, and the
PIA, DHS’s design team went to work. The team designed AIS with stages in
mind: the capacity to share or disseminate CTIs; and the capacity to receive
CTIs from others, then filter or sanitize data that is received, perform any human analysis that is necessary; and disseminate those CTIs.131 Receiving CTIs
from the private sector is what most worried civil liberties advocates, particularly whether companies would indiscriminately share personal information
with the government.132 The AIS design team decided to limit even the possibility that PII could be shared by leveraging a structured format that allows

DHS & DOJ GUIDANCE, supra note 97, at 9-10
See supra pp. 15-16; Oversight of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015: Before the Subcomm. On Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Prot., and Sec. Techn. Of the H. Homeland Sec
Comm., 114 Cong. 4 (June 15, 2015) (statement of Matthew J. Eggers, Exec. Dir., Cybersecurity Police, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
129 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NPPD AT A GLANCE 1 (2013),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/nppd-at-a-glance-071614.pdf.
130 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE AUTOMATED INDICATOR SHARING (AIS) DHS/NPPD/PIA-029(A) 1 (2016), https://www.uscert.gov/sites/default/files/ais_files/PIA_NPPD-AIS.pdf [hereinafter PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT].
131 Id. at 1-2.
132 See supra p. 20.
127
128
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inputs only in certain fields.133 That is, the capability only allows machines to
insert certain fields of data into what is referred to as the AIS Profile, and very
few fields even allow the insertion of personally identifiable information. The
DHS/DOJ Guidance explains, “[S]tandardized fields in structured formats can
be used to establish a profile that limits the type of information in a cyber
threat indicator[.] DHS’s Automated Indicator Sharing (AIS) initiative uses
this means of controlling the type of information that may be shared using the
automated system[.]”134
By limiting the information that can be submitted, the design team was able
to resolve many of the core concerns. For example, the DHS/DOJ guidance
states that a spear phishing email might be the source of a possible CTI. In the
alleged phishing email, the “from” or “sender” line of the email would be critical for analysts to have; they must be able to understand who the sender is. If
there is a malicious URL in the body of the email, that is also critical to analysts. Analysts would also need to be given access to any malware files that
are attached to the email, and possibly to the “subject” line.135 However, information in the “to” is not particularly relevant to the investigation and could
contain personally identifiable information. The guidance states, “The name
and e-mail address of the targets of the email (i.e., the “To” address), however,
would be personal information not directly related to a cybersecurity threat and
therefore should not typically be included as part of the cyber threat indicator.”136 The PIA concludes that
“Much of the information within an indicator is centered on an observable fact
about the cyber threat. For example, a cyber threat indicator has a variety of observable characteristics: a malicious email, internet protocol (IP) addresses, file
hashes, domain names, uniform resource locators (URLs), malware files, and
malware artifacts (attributes without a file). The specificity and nature of the observable facts are designed to reduce the risk that a cyber threat indicator contains
personal content or information inappropriate to share.”137

The story is similar with defensive measures. As the term is defined in statute, it does not include information that can be personally identifiable; instead,
“it will generally consist principally of technical information that can be used
to detect and counter a cybersecurity threat.”138
Therefore, extensive precautions were taken to ensure that personally identifiable information would not be submitted. If it is, the AIS capability reviews
and sanitizes information received to ensure that scrubs are done before any
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AIS, supra note 95.
DHS & DOJ GUIDANCE, supra note 97, at 6.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 7.
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data is disseminated.139 DHS employs various sanitization techniques to remove any remaining PII not necessary to understanding the cyber threat.140 If
an automated technique is not available and/or able to remove PII within a data
element, then that data element is placed in a queue for human review and not
shared until appropriately resolved. As the PIA states,
“DHS uses the AIS Profile to standardize the indicator and defensive measure information and implement a series of automated and manual processes to ensure
that unrelated information is removed from the cyber threat indicator or defensive
measure before it is disseminated to the AIS participants. Using the AIS Profile in
this manner further minimizes privacy, civil liberties, and other compliance risks
that may arise when PII and other sensitive information is submitted.”141

Designing the capability in this manner presented more than privacy and
civil liberties benefits – it also enables the technology to function more efficiently. As the PIA explains, “By narrowly scoping the AIS Profile to those
definitions [provided in the statute], the expected content of AIS submissions
is predictable, thus more easily enabling the usage of automated privacy enhancing controls.”142
The design of the AIS capability could only be provided by, and with the
support of, privacy experts. Because they were part of the AIS design team,
these concepts were built into the capability. Combined with the procedural
protections included in the statute and the guidance documents, the public can
be assured that the sharing of cyber threat indicators and defensive measures
will be undertaken in a way that respects our core values.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the life of the Department of Homeland Security, the Office for
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties and Privacy Office have made substantial contributions to improving security programs and operations. The Congress intended for these then-unique positions to help shape Departmental policy and
build greater public confidence in the new Cabinet agency. The impact has
been felt widely, from conditions in immigration detention facilities to reforms
in watchlisting to agreements with foreign governments.
The Automated Indicator Sharing capability demonstrates that the civil liberties structures built into the Homeland Security Act significantly helps the
Department as it designs new security programs. New technologies can be
designed to enhance both privacy and security. When both technology and
139
140
141
142

PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 130, at 1-2.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
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civil liberties addressed, public confidence that the government will handle
data with discretion and effectiveness will greatly increase.

